Four Questions of Iterated Grounding by Kovacs, David Mark
FOUR QUESTIONS OF ITERATED GROUNDING 
 
[forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 
 Draft; please cite the final version] 
 
Abstract: The Question of Iterated Grounding (QIG) asks what grounds the grounding facts. 
Although the question received a lot of attention in the past few years, it is usually discussed 
independently of another important issue: the connection between metaphysical explanation and the 
relation or relations that supposedly “back” it. I will show that once we get clear on the distinction 
between metaphysical explanation and the relation(s) backing it, we can distinguish no fewer than four 
questions lumped under QIG. I will also argue that given some plausible assumptions about what it 
would take for a relation to back metaphysical explanation, many salient views about grounding allow 
us to give “easy” answers to these questions—easy in the sense that we can straightforwardly derive 
them from the respective conception of grounding without getting into the sorts of complexities that 
typically inform answers to QIG. The paper’s main upshot is that we cannot expect to make much 




Much has been written lately about grounding, a relation that is thought to have a distinctively 
metaphysical explanatory import.1 For example mental facts might be grounded in physical facts, 
moral facts in natural facts, facts about wholes in the properties and relations among their parts, and 
so on. In lines with much of the literature, I will express grounding using a sentential connective, ‘<’, 
whose behavior is similar to that of the natural language expression ‘because’ except that it takes a 
sentence on the right side (the “grounded” side) and a plurality of sentences on the left side (the 





1 Contemporary classics that define the direction of much of the contemporary literature include Fine 2001, 2012, 
Correia 2005: Ch. 3, Schaffer 2009, and Rosen 2010. 
2 See Fine 2001, 2012, deRosset 2013, Dasgupta 2014b and Litland 2017 for similar treatments. Dasgupta (2014a) 
conceives of grounding as irreducibly many-many, rather than one-many; unfortunately, in the present paper I cannot 
discuss this interesting proposal. 
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There are other ways of expressing grounding (a familiar one is to express it as many-one relation 
between facts)3, but in what follows I will stick to the connective approach partly out of convenience 
and partly in order to avoid difficult but largely tangential questions about the metaphysics of facts. 
As far as I can see, the choice between relational and connective formulations will make little 
difference to the rest of the paper. For stylistic reasons I will often informally speak of a relation of 
grounding that holds between the facts that A1…An and the fact that B, but this should always be 
read as elliptical for simply saying that A1…An < B. My main focus throughout the paper will be on 
full grounding (A1…An fully ground B when they are non-redundantly sufficient on their own to 
ground B) rather than partial grounding (which holds between any proper sub-plurality of B’s full 
grounds and B itself).4 Moreover, I will work with a factive notion of grounding, i.e. I will assume 
that if A1…An < B then A1…An as well as B are true. 
The notion of grounding raises a vexed question: what grounds the grounding facts? That is, 
what should we write in the place of X1…Xk in claims of the form, 
 
X1…Xk < (A1…An < B)? 
 
Call this the Question of Iterated Grounding (QIG).5 The question is important for a number of reasons. 
First, grounding is usually thought of as a “level-connector”: a relation that connects fundamental 
																																																								
3 Rosen (2010), Trogdon (2013), Skiles (2015) and Dixon (2016), among others, treat rounding as a relation between 
facts, while Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005) and Schaffer (2009) construe it as a category-neutral relation. 
4 See Fine 2012 for a discussion of the conceptual link between full and partial grounding. 
5 The question has first been raised by Sider (2011: 106–107) more generally about fundamentality and level-connecting 
notions and by Bennett (2011) specifically about grounding. 
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bits of reality to non-fundamental bits. As a result, it’s often taken to be the right notion to express 
general philosophical theses to the effect that facts of a certain type constitute the full basis for other 
facts. This raises some questions about the status of the connecting facts themselves. One concerns 
a doctrine Sider dubbed “Purity”, according to which fundamental facts feature only fundamental 
notions (2011: 106). If Purity is true, it’s hard to see how facts about grounding could be 
fundamental. These facts involve both the grounds and what they ground, and the latter (being 
themselves grounded) are bound to be non-fundamental. But if the grounding facts are non-
fundamental, they require further facts to ground them, which (for similar reasons) cannot be 
fundamental and require yet further grounds… and so we are off to an infinite regress. 
Second, Dasgupta (2014b) raises a closely related problem for physicalism, though as he notes, 
the problem applies to any general level-connecting thesis according to which all facts are grounded 
in fundamental facts of a certain sort. If physicalism is understood as the doctrine that all 
fundamental facts are physical, then what should we think of facts about physical facts grounding 
non-physical facts? If those facts are ungrounded and thus fundamental, then some fundamental 
facts are not physical, after all. But if they are grounded, then once again we face a regress: what 
grounds the facts that in turn ground the facts about the physical facts grounding the non-physical 
facts? And what grounds those facts? And so on. Whether either Sider’s or Dasgupta’s regress is 
vicious is a contentious issue. Although there’s a good case to be made that these regresses 
ultimately don’t threaten the well-foundedness of grounding, one might still be wary of positing an 
infinite series of increasingly complex grounding facts.6 
Third, and finally, answering the question of what (if anything) grounds the grounding facts 
might give us a deeper understanding of the nature of grounding. Extant answers to QIG have 																																																								
6 Bennett (2011: 30) asserts that the regress violates the well-foundedness of grounding; Dixon (2016) and Rabin and 
Rabern (2016) independently argue that the regress is consistent with any salient way of understanding well-foundedness. 
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weighty implications for whether grounding is a superinternal relation (i.e., whether the existence of 
the grounding facts by itself suffices for those facts to ground the grounded facts)7 and for the 
relation between grounding and other notions, including essence8, metaphysical lawhood9, and a 
non-factive cousin of grounding10. For this reason, even if QIG falls short of posing a paradox, it 
still raises a question interesting enough on its own right to merit addressing. 
In the present paper, I don’t wish to defend any particular answer to QIG. Instead, I will argue 
that an important consideration that crucially bears on it has been neglected: the exact relation 
between grounding and metaphysical explanation. Lately, it has become standard to distinguish 
between grounding qua a metaphysical type of explanation and grounding qua the relation that 
“backs” such explanations. In section 2, I will show that once we recognize this distinction, we can 
distinguish no fewer than four questions in the vicinity of QIG. In section 3, I will examine the 
popular but vague slogan that grounding “backs” metaphysical explanation and argue that backing is 
itself best understood as a special case of metaphysical explanation. In the sections to follow 
(sections 4–7) I will argue that depending on whether grounding is identical to or merely “backs” 
metaphysical explanation, many versions of QIG have answers that are trivially entailed by the 
respective conception of grounding. The main exception is what I will call the “Question of 
Producing Production”, which I will suggest is the question future inquiries into QIG should 
primarily focus on (although by then we will have seen that for many grounding theorists this 
question doesn’t even arise). The main upshot will be that QIG cannot be tackled in isolation from 
																																																								
7 Bennett 2011, 2017: Ch. 7, deRosset 2013; cf. Litland 2015, Loss 2015, and Carnino 2017 
8 Dasgupta 2014b; cf. Rosen 2010, Audi 2012a, 2012b, and Fine 2012 
9 See Wilsch 2016 and Schaffer 2017a, 2017b. See also Rosen 2006, Kment 2014 (Ch. 6), and Glazier 2017, though note 
that these three authors also assign an important role to essence in characterizing metaphysical laws. 
10 Litland 2017. 
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the question of how grounding is related to explanation and that no matter how we spell out the 
connection, it will bear on QIG in hitherto unnoticed ways.11 
 
2. What  question of iterated grounding? 
Above I described grounding as an “explanatory relation”, and in particular as the relation at issue in 
metaphysical explanations. As an increasing number of grounding theorists have noted in recent 
years, this description is ambiguous. The phrase “explanatory relation” could mean a species of the 
general relation of explanation. Thus understood, ‘grounding’ is simply another word for 																																																								
11 Jessica Wilson (2014: 568 n80, 2018) has recently argued that QIG is a pseudo-problem. On her view grounding is a 
disjunction of “small-g grounding relations” (realization, the determinate-determinable relation, token identity, and other 
relations widely recognized before the “grounding revolution”), and QIG is an artifact of the “abstract nature of 
Grounding” (2018: 507) that doesn’t arise with “small-g” grounding relations. She writes: 
 
“If someone tells you that mental states are determinables of  physical determinates, there’s no temptation to 
ask, ‘But in  virtue of what do they stand in the determinable–determinate relation? […] In the twenty-four years 
since  Yablo […] suggested that […] mental states [were] determinables of physical states, there have been 
many  critical discussions of this view […] but not one has raised these  sorts of meta-level dependence 
questions.” (2018: 508; emphasis in the original) 
 
I think Wilson is mistaken on both counts. First, these questions make perfect sense; even if it had been true that 
nobody had asked them in the relevant literatures, it would just be all the worse for those literatures. Second, these 
questions have been asked. The issue of what grounds/explains the identity facts lately received considerable attention 
(see Shumener 2017 for an overview) and was problematized even before grounding appeared on the stage (Chalmers 
and Jackson 2001). Moreover, Ehring defends a variant of Wilson’s own (1999) subset account of realization on the 
basis that it provides a “metaphysical explanation for why the sets of causal powers of mental properties stand in the subset 
relation to the sets of causal powers of certain physical properties” (2011: 172; emphasis in the original) and also extends 
this view to the determinate-determinable relation (2011: 139–143). 
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metaphysical explanation.12 Alternatively, “explanatory relation” is often used for the kinds of 
relations that “back” or “underlie” metaphysical explanations; a sort of “metaphysical causation”. 
Understood this way, ‘grounding’ means not metaphysical explanation but the relation (be it either a 
single unified relation or a disjunction of relations, a la J. Wilson) that underlies metaphysical 
explanation.13 If there is such an underlying relation, then that relation is to metaphysical explanation 
what causation is to scientific explanation. Following the terminology I introduced in my earlier 
work (Kovacs 2017), I will refer to the relation that putatively “backs” metaphysical explanation as 
‘production’. 
The distinction between production and metaphysical explanation resembles a similar one 
Raven (2015) draws between “Separatist” and “Unionist” views, where the former identify 
grounding with the underlying relation whereas the latter with metaphysical explanation itself. 
However, I see Raven’s taxonomy as an indirect way of getting at the more fundamental distinction 
between production and metaphysical explanation. Strictly speaking, the Separatism/Unionism 
debate is merely verbal: it’s about how to use the word ‘grounding’.14 Separatism is just the view that 
there is a relation of production beside metaphysical explanation, amended with the semantic claim 
that this relation is the meaning of ‘grounding’. More problematically, even unionists are free to 
believe in production so long as they reserve ‘grounding’ for metaphysical explanation. In what 
follows, I will primarily focus on the distinction between production and metaphysical explanation, 
																																																								
12 Proponents of this conception include Fine (2001, 2012), Raven (2012), deRosset (2013), Dasgupta (2014a, 2014b, 
2017), and Litland (2017), among others. 
13 This conception of grounding has been endorsed, for example, by Schaffer (2009, 2016, 2017a, 2017b), Audi (2012a, 
2012b), Leuenberger (2014), Skiles (2015) and A. Wilson (2018). Schaffer and A. Wilson explicitly refer to grounding as 
“metaphysical causation”. 
14 See also Dasgupta 2017: 94 n8 for this point. 
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irrespective of which of the two deserves to be called ‘grounding’. In my official formulations, ‘<’ 
will thus henceforth receive an index depending on whether it’s used to express metaphysical 
explanation or production; the former I will represent with ‘<e’ and the latter with ‘<p’ (I will keep 
using the indexless ‘<’ in contexts where the ambiguity is intended).15 
Let me say a little more about ‘production’. Henceforth I will use this word as a placeholder for 
whichever relation or family of relations “backs” metaphysical explanation, if there is any. More 
neutrally: the connective ‘<p’ in ‘A1…An <p B’ will express whichever connection is “responsible” for 
the truth of ‘A1…An <e B’ (or perhaps ‘A1…An, C1…Ck <e B’, where C1…Ck are ancillary conditions 
that don’t themselves play a role in producing B—more on this in a moment). Most theorists of 
metaphysical explanation adopt a model of explanation on which all explanations are “backed” or 
“undergirded” by worldly relations of determination. This picture is sometimes called (misleadingly, 
in my view) “explanatory realism”; I prefer to use the less theoretically loaded name “Backing 
Model”.16 All separatists accept the Backing Model; typically, though not always, they single out 
grounding as the relation that backs all metaphysical explanations. Less obviously, many unionists 
																																																								
15  Schaffer (2016) has recently argued that the connective formulation is not well suited for grounding as the 
“underlying” connection, just like it wouldn’t be suitable for a worldly relation of causation. I think he is wrong about 
this (causation itself can be expressed with a connective, without reifying the causal relata; see, e.g., van Inwagen 2012: 
164–165 and Skow 2016: 33–34), and at any rate my choice to express grounding with a connective makes little 
difference to the argument of this paper. More generally, the controversy between connective and relational views strikes 
me as entirely orthogonal to the Separatism/Unionism debate. 
16 Here, too, I use terminology that I introduced in my earlier work (Kovacs forthcoming-1). Advocates of the Backing 
Model include Ruben (1990), Kim (1994), and Skow (2016). The name “explanatory realism” is misleading because 
explanation might be an objective matter (in the sense of being mind-independent) without being “backed” by 
explanatory relations; see Friedman 1974: 7–8. See also Kovacs 2017, forthcoming-1 and Taylor 2018 for objections to 
the Backing Model. 
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accept the Backing Model too; they just differ from separatists in the range of relations they posit to 
back explanations. For example, an increasingly popular strand of theorizing traces metaphysical 
explanations back to essences.17 As I use the word ‘production’, the resulting relation of essential 
connectedness—insofar as it “backs” metaphysical explanation—counts as a kind of production. So 
do J. Wilson’s “small-g” grounding relations.18 
Proponents of the Backing Model have three possible options regarding the relation between 
production and metaphysical explanation. The simplest view is that nothing needs to be added to 
production for metaphysical explanation; the former is by itself sufficient for the latter.19 A second 
possibility is that production needs to be amended by “ancillary conditions”, for example 
metaphysical laws20 or the satisfaction of certain epistemic and/or pragmatic criteria21, to get a 
complete explanation. These ancillary factors are part of what explain the metaphysical explananda, 
but they aren’t among the facts that produce them. A third option is that ancillary conditions do play 
a role in metaphysical explanations, but they are also among the producers. For example, perhaps 
some facts bear a multitude of different small-g grounding relations to an explanandum, which 
makes all of them qualify as its producers but only some of them as ancillary conditions. I don’t 
mean to rule out this possibility, but in what follows I will treat it as a special case of the first option. 																																																								
17 See Rosen 2010, Fine 2012, and Correia 2013; see also Audi 2012a, 2012b, Kment 2014: Ch. 6, and Glazier 2017 
(although the latter three count as separatists according to Raven’s taxonomy). 
18 Some authors distinguish between grounding-based and essentialist explanations (Kment 2014: 164, Glazier 2017). 
When I count essential connectedness as a type of production, I don’t mean to beg the question against such views; 
rather, I use ‘production’ stipulatively for any relation that plays a “backing” role in metaphysical explanations similar to 
that of grounding (as understood by such essentialists). 
19 This seems to be the view of Skiles (2015), Skow (2016), and A. Wilson (2018). 
20 See Kment 2014: Ch 6 and Schaffer 2017a, 2017b. 
21 See Audi 2012b: 119–120, deRosset 2013: 13, and Trogdon 2018: 1295–6. 
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The main distinction I’m interested in here, and which I will use to map logical space, is between 
views that assert and views that deny that every partial metaphysical explanans of a fact is also a 
partial producer of that fact. In that taxonomy, ancillary conditions that are a special type of 
producer are producers nonetheless.22 This means that all of the “simple” views I will discuss in 
sections 4–7 will have sub-varieties that recognize a distinction between “mere” producers and 
producers that have the special status of also being ancillary conditions. But as far as I can see the 
existence of this sub-category doesn’t affect my discussion of those views (at least not at the level of 
abstraction at which I will consider them). For this reason, in what follows I will stipulatively use the 
expression ‘ancillary conditions’ only for things that occur in the explanans base but not in the 
production base of a metaphysical explanandum. 
For simplicity’s sake, in what follows I will collectively refer to all proponents of the Backing 
Model (whether they accept one type of production or many, and whether they think that 
production needs to be amended with ancillary conditions to yield a full explanation) as production 
theorists or p-theorists. They can be contrasted with grounding theorists who don’t commit 
themselves to any underlying relation to back metaphysical explanation. While this is a coherent 
combination of views, few defended it in print; as we have seen, those who deny that there is a 
single relation underlying metaphysical explanations nonetheless tend to agree that something 
underlies them. At any rate, I will refer to those who reject the Backing Model as explanation 
theorists or e-theorists.23 
																																																								
22 Thanks to an anonymous referee for requesting more clarity about the status of ancillary conditions. 
23 I first introduced this terminology in Kovacs 2017. Views of metaphysical explanation that explicitly decline to assign 
any role to “underlying” or “backing” relations have been defended by Shaheen (2016), Kovacs (2017, forthcoming-1, 
forthcoming-2) and Miller and Norton (2017, forthcoming) and seriously considered by Thompson (2016) and Dasgupta 
(2017). 
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Once we are clear about the distinction between production and metaphysical explanation, we 
can distinguish four sub-questions that could be meant by QIG: 
 
(i) The Question of Explaining Explanation: What are X1…Xk such that X1…Xk <e (A1…An <e B)? 
(ii) The Question of Producing Explanation: What are X1…Xk such that X1…Xk <p (A1…An <e B)? 
(iii) The Question of Producing Production: What are X1…Xk such that X1…Xk <p (A1…An <p B)? 
(iv) The Question of Explaining Production: What are X1…Xk such that X1…Xk <e (A1…An <p B)
24 
 
Note that while questions (ii)-(iv) arise only for p-theorists, everybody has to face question (i). For 
this reason, it is advisable to start with this disambiguation of QIG. But before doing so, I need to 
address one more crucial preliminary issue: the question of how we should understand the popular 
but under-examined slogan that a relation “backs” metaphysical explanation. As it will soon become 





P-theorists frequently say that grounding “backs” metaphysical explanation. But what does it mean 
to say that grounding (or any relation, for that matter) “backs” metaphysical explanation? This 
question is rarely discussed in the literature but will be important for much of what follows. I can 
think of two major candidates. The first one is that “backing” is itself a case of (full) metaphysical 																																																								
24 Perhaps (ii) and (iv) are not strictly speaking disambiguations of QIG, since they use ‘grounding’ with two different 
meanings in the same question. Still, they are in the close vicinity of QIG and will be instrumental in addressing other 
disambiguations, so I will treat them as such. 
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explanation. Using ‘production’ as a placeholder for whatever backs metaphysical explanation, this 
gives us the following thesis: 
 
Backing-iff-Full-Explanation (BFE): Production backs metaphysical explanation iff  
□((A1…An <e B) → ((A1…An <p B) <e (A1…An <e B))).25 
  
Different p-theorists can fill in the ‘<p’ in BFE in different ways: some will think it’s facts featuring a 
unified relation of grounding that metaphysically explain the metaphysical explanation facts, while 
others might hold that it’s facts featuring various determination relations. What’s common to all 
versions is that they understand backing as full metaphysical explanation: if production backs 
explanation, then whenever A1…An produce B, this is by itself sufficient for A1…An to also 
metaphysically explain B. While BFE has rarely been stated explicitly (though see the citations in the 
previous footnote), it’s a reasonable interpretation of what at least some p-theorists mean when they 
say that grounding backs metaphysical explanation. P-theorists often freely go back-and-forth 
between grounding and metaphysical explanation, officially distinguishing the two but often using 
the one to infer various features of the other. This practice makes sense if one accepts BFE as a 
background assumption.26 
The most plausible alternative to BFE I can think of is that production partially explains 
metaphysical explanation and requires some ancillary conditions to fully explain it. This 
interpretation is encouraged by remarks made by some grounding theorists to the effect that there is 																																																								
25 See Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005: 28, Schnieder 2010: 326–8 and Kovacs 2017: 2934 for similar interpretations of 
‘backing’-talk. 
26 Though see Maurin forthcoming for an argument to the effect that more than anything, this practice indicates a 
serious problem with the relevant conception of grounding. 
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a gap between grounding and metaphysical explanation, whereby something extra, e.g. laws or 
epistemic conditions, needs to be added to the former in order to get the latter (see footnotes 20-
21). Then we can propose the following as a second possible interpretation of the idea that 
production backs metaphysical explanation (in the definitions that follow, ‘C’ and its indexed 
variants will henceforth stand for ancillary conditions): 
 
(Backing-iff-Partial-Explanation, BPE) Production backs metaphysical explanation iff 
□((A1…An <e B) → (((A1…An <p B), C1…Ck) <e (A1…An <e B))). 
 
(Informally: necessarily, if A1…An metaphysically explain B, then A1…An’s metaphysically explaining 
B is metaphysically explained by A1…An’s producing B and ancillary conditions C1…Ck.) BFE and 
BPE also have their production-based analogues: perhaps production backs metaphysical 
explanation in the sense that the production facts fully or partially produce the metaphysical 
explanation facts (in the latter case along with ancillary conditions). However, given the way I 
understand production here, these options (with one minor caveat, which I will explain shortly) 
aren’t really competitors of the two views described above. This is especially clear when we identify 
backing with full production. Since on this view production is sufficient on its own for metaphysical 
explanation, any facts that produce a metaphysical explanation fact automatically metaphysically 
explain that metaphysical explanation fact, too. Moreover, since I’m using ‘production’ for whatever 
backs metaphysical explanation, any facts that metaphysically explain a metaphysically explanation 
fact also produce that fact. Thus on this kind of view, even if ‘backing’ means full production rather 
than full metaphysical explanation, we nonetheless get the biconditional encapsulated by BFE: 
production backs metaphysical explanation iff the production facts metaphysically explain the 
metaphysical explanation facts. 
	 13 
Things are trickier on the assumption that backing is only partial production. Simply replacing 
‘metaphysically explain’ with ‘produce’ in the definition of backing would yield the following thesis: 
 
Backing-iff-Partial-Production (BPP): Production backs metaphysical explanation iff 
□((A1…An <e B) → ((A1…An, C1…Ck <p B) <e (A1…An <e B))). 
 
(Informally: Necessarily, if A1…An metaphysically explain B then A1…An’s metaphysically explaining 
B is explained by A1…An and ancillary conditions C1…Ck jointly producing B.) However, BPP 
cannot be right. We distinguished producers from ancillary conditions in order to put a wedge 
between production and metaphysical explanation, so the ancillary conditions that help explain B 
cannot be among its producers. (Recall that this is a consequence of how we cut up the terrain in 
section 2: would-be ancillary conditions that are among the producers would already be accounted 
for in BFE, since they would be among the A1…An that produce as well as metaphysically explain 
B). So, p-theorists who want to understand backing in terms of partial explanation should accept the 
very same thesis about production that proponents of BFE are already committed to, namely BFP: 
A1…An’s metaphysically explaining B is explained by A1…An jointly producing B and ancillary 
conditions C1…Ck—but C1…Ck aren’t themselves among the producers of B. 
Hopefully this clarifies the tangled relation between backing, grounding, production and 
metaphysical explanation. Since it’s not customary to explicitly say what backing is, it might be 
helpful to reiterate how I see the space of conceptual possibilities here. P-theorists who don’t believe 
that metaphysical explanations require ancillary conditions should accept both BFE and BFP. They 
can pick whichever they prefer as their official definition of ‘backing’ but should still accept the other 
as a true biconditional. By contrast, p-theorists who do require ancillary conditions can choose 
between BPE and BFP. In the former case, the production facts will serve as partial explanantia that, 
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amended with ancillary conditions, fully explain the metaphysical explanation facts. In the latter case, 
the production facts will provide a full production base, although they still need to be amended with 
ancillary conditions to fully explain the metaphysical explanation facts. As far as I can see, the 
difference between these two options is largely verbal: they both imply that production facts fully 
produce and partially explain the metaphysical explanation facts and only differ in which of these 
relations should be meant by the word ‘backing’. So, in what follows I will treat them together. 
A third, more deflationary, interpretation of ‘backing’-talk could be that production backs 
metaphysical explanation simply in the sense of being “tracked” by it. 27  That is, the job of 
metaphysical explanations is to give information about the worldly relations of production, and it is 
only in this weak sense that the latter “back” the former.28 However, I don’t think this proposal 
gives us a clear alternative to the options discussed above, since the expression ‘gives information’ 
can be understood in multiple ways. One sense in which metaphysical explanations could “give 
information” is by being representational (e.g. linguistic) things that express the production facts.29 
But saying that our ‘metaphysically explain’-sentences express facts about production is just another 
way of saying that metaphysical explanation is grounding—a view I already discussed above. 
Alternatively, one could maintain that ‘metaphysical explanation’-sentences give information about 
production in some more indirect way. Maybe so, but this doesn’t yet tell us what the connection is 
between metaphysical explanation and production. The main intuition behind “backing”-talk is that 
production is prior to metaphysical explanation, rather than the other way round. My proposal to 
understand backing in terms of explanation is a way to make sense of this priority intuition, whereas 																																																								
27 Thanks to Jonathan Shaheen for drawing my attention to this possibility. 
28 Glazier (forthcoming) briefly mentions this possibility. 
29 I think deRosset (ms: Ch. 1) has in mind a similar view when suggesting that the Unionism/Separatism debate is 
confused. 
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the bare claim that metaphysical explanation has consequences for production is fully consistent 
with the view that production is downstream from metaphysical explanation.30 
Since thus far discussions explicitly about backing have been largely absent from the literature, 
clear endorsements of any of the abovementioned theses are rare (though see footnote 25). I still 
find it plausible that either BFE or BPE/BFP has to be right partly on interpretative grounds and 
partly because I don’t see plausible alternatives. It is therefore important to note that one p-theorist, 
Paul Audi, explicitly declines to spell out backing in terms of either grounding or explanation. He 
reasons as follows: 
 
“I take grounding to be a singular relation between facts, but it seems to me that grounding relations depend on 
and follow from the natures of the properties involved in these facts. […] It might seem, then, that we can use the 
notion of essential connectedness to explain what grounds what. […] [But the] principle [that] the fact that any 
given grounding relation holds is itself grounded in the fact that the properties in one fact are essentially 
connected to the properties in the other […] faces a number of difficulties. Start with some grounding fact: 
(4) [x is maroon] grounds [x is red]. 
The principle requires that this fact be grounded in the fact that the properties in each fact are essentially 
connected. So we have: 
(5) [EC(maroonness, redness)] grounds [[x is maroon] grounds [x is red]].  
But now the principle requires that (5) be grounded in an essential-connection fact, one connecting the 
properties in the grounding fact (in this case, itself about essential connection) with those in the grounded fact 
(in this case, the first-order grounding fact). We immediately face the threat of regress and a proliferation of 
iterated facts about essential connection.” (Audi 2012a: 693–694) 
 
In effect, Audi worries about a version of QIG: if the grounding facts “follow from” the essence 
facts by being grounded (produced) by them, we are off to a regress. And it’s easy to see how one 																																																								
30 This would be a grounding analogue of causal idealism (cf. footnote 32). 
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could raise a similar worry about the grounding facts “backing” the metaphysical explanation facts 
by metaphysically explaining them. However, this doesn’t strike me as a strong motivation against 
identifying backing with metaphysical explanation. It’s up for grabs whether the regress Audi 
mentions actually arises, and if so, whether it’s vicious. It suffices to note that it makes little 
difference to the regress whether we state it in terms of backing or grounding. If it’s legitimate to ask 
what grounds the grounding facts, then it makes just as much sense to ask what grounds the backing 
facts. Audi’s regress arises solely because (5) is prima facie apt for a grounding explanation; whether it 
features grounding or a primitive backing relation is neither here nor there. 
I conclude that we should interpret the slogan that grounding or some other relations 
(collectively: production) back metaphysical explanation in terms of either metaphysical explanation 
or production. Doing so is both justified on interpretative grounds and necessary to avoid shrouding 
a central idea of the Backing Model in mystery. Moreover, resisting this reductive characterization 
has no obvious advantage. 
Here’s where we are now. We have four questions of iterated grounding, one arising for 
everyone and three others arising only for p-theorists. We also have four possible interpretations of 
“backing”-talk, which (I argued) can be reduced to two for all purposes that matter. Armed with 
these distinctions, we can now look afresh at QIG, or rather, the four sub-questions it disambiguates 
into. I will start with the most complex and perhaps most fundamental of these questions, the 
Question of Explaining Explanation. 
 
4. The Question of Explaining Explanation 
Our question is what in section 2 I introduced as 
 
The Question of Explaining Explanation. What are X1…Xk such that X1…Xk <e (A1…An <e B)? 
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As it will later emerge, starting with this question has strategic advantages, since certain answers to it 
automatically settle some of the other questions. We should distinguish two possibilities: (a) 
production backs metaphysical explanation; (b) production doesn’t back metaphysical explanation. 
Moreover, in line with the foregoing discussion of backing, we can distinguish two sub-cases within 
(a): (aa) the production facts fully metaphysically explain the metaphysical explanation facts, or (ab) 
the production facts fully produce the metaphysical explanation facts but fully explain them only in 
tandem with ancillary conditions. 
 
4.1. BFE and the answer to The Question of Explaining Explanation 
If production backs metaphysical explanation, and this implies that the production facts fully 
metaphysically explain the metaphysical explanation facts (as BFE has it), we immediately get an 
answer to the Question of Explaining Explanation. It goes as follows: 
 
Simple Productionism about Explaining Explanation: 
□((A1…An <e B) → ((A1…An <p B) <e (A1…An <e B))) 
 
In words: necessarily, for any metaphysical explanation fact E, E is metaphysically explained by the 
production of E’s explanandum by E’s explanantia. Of course, since every metaphysical explanation 
fact is metaphysically explained by a production fact, this simple answer also applies to iterated 
explanations (from now on, in longer formulas I will set occurrences of ‘<p’ and ‘<e’ as the main 
connective in bold). For example, (A1…An <p B) <e (A1…An <e B) is metaphysically explained by 
(A1…An <p B) <p (A1…An <e B). And the explanation of why the latter metaphysically explains the 
former is ((A1…An <p B) <p (A1…An <e B)) <p ((A1…An <p B) <e (A1…An <e B))—and so on. The 
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general recipe for getting the explanantia of any metaphysical explanation fact is to keep its 
explanans and explanandum clauses fixed and “replace” the relation of metaphysical explanation 
between them with the relation of production. 
 
4.2. BPE/BFP and the answer to The Question of Explaining Explanation 
Perhaps the production facts only partially explain the metaphysical explanation facts and need to be 
amended by ancillary conditions (metaphysical laws, epistemic constraints, or something similar) in 
order to yield a complete explanation of the explanation facts. A tempting first-pass answer along 
these lines to the Question of Explaining Explanation might go as follows: 
 
Naïve Ancillary Productionism about Explaining Explanation: 
□((A1…An, C1…Ck <e B) → ((A1…An, C1…Ck <p B) <e (A1…An, C1…Ck <e B))) 
 
In words: necessarily, if A1…An and ancillary conditions C1…Ck metaphysically explain B, they do so 
because A1…An and C1…Ck produce B. However, Naïve Ancillary Productionism doesn’t work as it 
stands. This is because it implies that C1…Ck are among the producers of B. But, as we have already 
discussed in section 3, ancillary conditions (as I understand them) are not supposed to be producers; 
the whole point of introducing them was to distinguish their role from that of the producers in 
metaphysical explanations. 
The solution is to systematically “remove” Ancillary Conditions from the production base and 
add them to the explanans base as a sui generis type of explanans. In the case of a metaphysical 
explanation whose explanans clause doesn’t itself involve metaphysical explanation, this method will 
give us that (A1…An <p B), C1…Ck  <e (A1…An, C1…Ck <e B). And the explanation of this fact will 
look like this: 
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(((A1…An <p B) <p (A1…An, C1…Ck <e B)), C’1…C’m) <e (((A1…An <p B), C1…Ck) <e 
(A1…An, C1…Ck <e B))) 
 
This suggests a general recipe. When looking for the sentence that explains a metaphysical 
explanation sentence, S, (i) replace S’s main connective ‘<e’ with ‘<p’, (ii) remove any ancillary 
conditions that appear as producers in the production base of S’s explanans clause, and then (iii) add 
ancillary conditions (the original ones or some new ones—see below) as extra explanantia if 
necessary. More generally: 
 
Sophisticated Ancillary Productionism about Explaining Explanation: 
□((A1…An, C1…Ck <e B) → ((A1…An <p B, C’1…C’m) <e (A1…An, C1…Ck <e B))) 
 
Informally: necessarily, if A1…An and ancillary conditions C1…Ck jointly metaphysically explain B, 
then this, in turn, is metaphysically explained by A1…An producing B and ancillary conditions 
C’1…C’m. There is an important question that this principle leaves open: are C’1…C’m identical to 
C1…Ck? That is, when some C1…Ck play the role of ancillary conditions in the explanans base of a 
metaphysical explanation E, can C1…Ck also play the very same role in the explanans base of a 
higher-order explanation whose explanandum is E or some additional ancillary conditions are 
needed? This is a substantive issue I cannot settle here. Nothing in the above formulation requires 
C1…Ck be identical to C’1…C’m, but if ancillary conditions are laws, I can see why one might be 
reluctant to admit an infinite number of metaphysical laws (perhaps an infinite number of possible 
epistemic constraints is less objectionable). 31  Suffice it to say that one version or other of 																																																								
31 See Schaffer (2017b: 316) for a related discussion (he argues that some metaphysical laws are fundamental). 
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Sophisticated Ancillary Productionism is a natural way to make sense of the idea that each 
metaphysical explanation fact is explained by its producers, along with some ancillary conditions that 
serve as its explanantia but not qua producers. 
 
4.3. Beyond the Backing Model 
In the previous two sub-sections I considered answers to the Question of Explaining Explanation 
that automatically fall out of natural interpretations of the Backing Model. But what if the Backing 
Model is false and metaphysical explanations aren’t backed by production? Since I have been using 
‘production’ simply for the relation supposedly backing metaphysical explanation, this would imply 
that metaphysical explanations aren’t backed by anything: not by grounding, not by essential 
connectedness, and not by “small-g” grounding relations or anything similar. How should we then 
approach the Question of Explaining Explanation? 
This question is difficult to answer with full generality because it would require us to know what 
a salient alternative to the Backing Model would look like, but few have bothered to develop one in 
detail. At this point, it’s worth emphasizing again that Unionism (in Raven’s sense) by itself doesn’t 
amount to a rejection of the Backing Model. Unionism is just a view about how we should use the 
word ‘grounding’ and as such is fully consistent with the claim that metaphysical explanations are 
backed by non-causal determinative relations. Indeed, most unionists, while primarily interested in 
the phenomenon of metaphysical explanation, are happy to assume that these explanations work 
because of the determinative relations that “back” them. 
I cannot offer here a complete survey of possible views that break with the Backing Model. 
What I can do is sketch one powerful alternative that used to be prominent in the philosophy of 
science and has in recent years made a bit of a comeback in metaphysics. According to a venerable 
tradition that can be traced back at least to Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), explanations are 
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arguments of a certain sort. Now, to be sure, many grounding theorists agree that there is a tight 
connection between explanations and arguments. But on the kind of view I’m presently interested 
in, explanations (at least metaphysical ones) strictly and literally are arguments: a true sentence of the 
form ‘A1…An explain B’ is shorthand for a sound argument in which A1…An are premises, B is the 
conclusion, and some further constraints are satisfied. Understanding explanations as arguments is 
particularly natural on what Strevens (2008: Ch. 1) aptly calls pattern subsumption views, and as a 
matter of fact, most argument views fit under this label. Pattern subsumption views see the essence 
of explanation as the subsumption of particular cases under general regularities: laws, law-like 
generalizations, and perhaps other general patterns. Of course, many (even most) proponents of the 
Backing Model will be happy to agree that generalizations play an important role in explanation. But 
pattern subsumption theorists think that properly understood, the patterns are all that there is to an 
explanation; what we would normally consider “backing” relations are at best downstream from 
these patterns.32 
Argument views of metaphysical explanation can take a number of forms. Influenced by 
Hempel and Oppenheim’s Deductive-Nomological account, Wilsch (2016) defends a DN model of 
metaphysical explanation, according to which explanations are deductively valid arguments with no 
non-redundant premises, at least one of which is a law of metaphysics.33 In my own work (Kovacs 
2017, forthcoming-2) I take inspiration from Kitcher (1989) and defend a unificationist account, 																																																								
32 This is most explicit in the work of Philip Kitcher, who in effect adopts a version of causal idealism: causal relations 
are projected onto the world as a by-product of our explanatory habits (1989: 496–7). See also Hempel 1965: 362–4. 
33 It somewhat complicates the picture that certain elements of Wilsch’s view resemble the Backing Model. He 
understands the laws of metaphysics in terms of primitive “construction operations”, for example composition and set-
formation; and the role of these operations is very similar to that of production relations. However, these niceties are 
irrelevant to my present concerns. Litland (2017) also defends a related view, but in his variant metaphysical laws don’t 
occur as premises; rather, their role is played by inference rules. 
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according to which metaphysical explanation is a holistic matter: an argument is explanatory just in 
case it instantiates an argument pattern that belongs to the most unified set of arguments, where the 
extent of unification is settled by a weighted set of criteria that (simplifying a bit) balance strength, 
simplicity and naturalness. And there may well be further, as of yet unoccupied, positions in logical 
space that also construe metaphysical explanations as arguments; the literature on scientific 
explanation witnessed countless variations and attempted improvements on the DN model34, and 
many of these may be at least as defensible in the metaphysical as in the scientific realm. 
None of these details have much significance, however, so long as we stick with the idea that 
metaphysical explanations are arguments. Anybody who maintains at least this much can thereby 
deflect the Question of Explaining Explanation as one that simply doesn’t arise. We can see why by 
getting explicit on what an explanatory argument is. Suppose that A1…An, perhaps along with some 
ancillary conditions, metaphysically explain B (to simplify matters I will ignore ancillary conditions 
for the rest of this section, since they don’t make any difference to the present discussion).35 That is, 






34 See Brody 1972, McCarthy 1977 and Railton 1981, among many others. 
35 Philosophers who assign some role to ancillary conditions differ on whether these should occur as premises in the 
argument should instead be treated more like inference rules that aren’t themselves among the premises; see, e.g., 
deRosset 2013 for the former and Litland 2017 and Schaffer 2017a for the latter view. Again, while the issue is otherwise 
important, it has no bearing on any our present concerns. Note, however, that the version of the view I will defend 









According to argument views, it is strictly speaking Argument that we should count as an 
explanation. Or more precisely, it is Argument that counts as an explanation in the sense of 
‘explanation’ that theorists of explanation should be interested in; A1…An and C1…Cn are also 
“explanations” in the sense that they are among the explanantia of the explanandum, B, but the 
explanatory product—that which is the proper focus of theories of explanation—is Argument. 
Argument is a more perspicuous way of expressing ‘A1…An metaphysically explain B’ or ‘B obtains 
because A1…An obtain’ (where ‘because’ receives a metaphysical reading).
36 
This is important because if explanations are arguments and their explananda are the 
conclusions of these arguments, then there cannot be such as thing as a higher-order explanation, 
i.e. an explanation whose explanandum is itself an explanation. Consider again the Question of 
Explaining Explanation: What are X1…Xn such that X1…Xn <e (A1…An <e B)? If explanations are 
arguments, this question simply doesn’t make sense. It translates into the question of what the 
premises of the explanatory argument are whose conclusion is another argument with B as its 
conclusion and A1… An as its premises. But of course, there can be no such argument. Arguments 
are sequences of sentences, whereas their conclusions are sentences; thus, a sequence of sentences is 																																																								
36  See White (1965: 17–22) for a more detailed discussion of the relation between explanation statements and 
explanatory arguments. I borrow the useful expression ‘explanatory product’ from Ruben (1990: 7–8). 
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the wrong kind of thing to serve as the conclusion of an argument. It is therefore something like a 
category mistake to ask what explains an explanation, metaphysical or otherwise. 
But can it be this easy to dissolve the Question of Explaining Explanation? On the basis of a 
similar reasoning, Litland (2017) has recently expressed sympathy with the idea that it’s illegitimate 
to ask what explains an explanation. However, he maintains that even if we can dismiss QIG on 
such grounds, we are still left with a close cousin of it. To paraphrase Litland’s formulation a bit, the 
residual question is what explains the truth of the proposition that there is an explanatory argument 
with A1…An as its premises and C as its conclusion. 
In my view this question too has a relatively simple answer: the existence of such an argument is 
explained by A1…An. This can be made intuitive in two steps. First step: it’s generally plausible that 
the existence of a sound argument is explained by its premises and its conclusion. Why is there a 
sound argument (explanatory or otherwise) with premises A1…An and conclusion B? Because of 
A1…An and B, which are all there is to the argument.
37, 38 Some might be tempted to add to the 
explanantia of there being an argument from A1…An to B the logical connection that A1…An bear to B 
(or inference rules, or logical laws, etc.), but this temptation should be resisted. For once we add 
this, it’s unclear why we should sop there: why don’t we also have to add as a separate explanans that 																																																								
37 One could try to further justify this step on the basis of the popular view that existential facts are grounded in their 
witnesses. There is an argument from A1…An to B because Argument is an argument from A1…An to B. And Argument is 
an argument from A1…An to B because of A1…An and B. 
38 There might be a more general account of why there is a valid argument from A1…An to B, whether that argument is 
sound or not (a valid but unsound argument obviously cannot have all of its premises as explanantia.) But explaining 
such arguments would require presupposing a non-factive notion of explanation, which goes far beyond the tools I’m 
presupposing here. Note also that all I attempt to do here is give a true answer to each of the four questions of iterated 
grounding; as I note in the concluding section, some of these questions might have more than one true answer. Thanks 
to Jon Litland for helpful discussion here. 
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if A1…An and B hold and B is a logical consequence of A1…An then there is an argument from 
A1…An to B? Of course, the worry is similar to Lewis Carroll’s famous infinite regress about 
deductive reasoning, and we can avoid it by insisting that A1…An and B by themselves explain why 
there is an argument from A1…An to B. 
Second step: if the argument is explanatory, then its conclusion is already fully explained by its 
premises. So while the existence of a sound argument from some premises to a conclusion is 
generally explained by the premises and the conclusion, in this special case we can make do with just 
the premises. That is, we can simplify the picture by saying that what explains the existence of an 
explanatory argument from A1…An to B are simply the argument’s premises, A1…An—we don’t 
need to separately add B, which is already explained by these.39 
It’s not hard to see that the view we end up with borrows features from two different answers 
to QIG. With respect to the metaphysical explanations themselves it’s a version of Trialism, the view 
that the grounding facts have the special status of not simply being ungrounded but not even being 
apt to be grounded.40 And with respect to facts about metaphysical explanation, it resembles what 
Litland (2017) calls the “Straightforward Account”: A1…An < B is grounded in A1…An for any 																																																								
39 Note that the account sketched above is addressed to the question of why there is such and such an explanatory argument. 
But as an anonymous reviewer points out, there is also the subtly different question of why such and such an argument is 
explanatory. The answer to this latter question should, in my view, stem from one’s general theory of metaphysical 
explanation and will substantially differ between different argument views. For example, DN theorists will think that the 
argument from A1…An to B is explanatory because A1…An non-redundantly entail B and at least one of A1…An is a 
metaphysical law, whereas unificationists might want to say that the argument in question is explanatory because it is part 
of the best systematization. 
40 See Dasgupta 2014a and Schaffer 2017a. Strictly speaking, Dasgupta defends a view on which grounding facts are 
grounded in some other facts (on his favored view, facts about essence), but these facts in turn are not apt to be 
grounded. The label ‘Trialism’ originates from deRosset 2013. 
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arbitrary iteration of grounding.41 By taking explanations to be arguments, both aspects of my 
approach can be independently motivated. For one, if explanations are arguments then there are 
syntactic constraints on the sorts of questions we can legitimately ask about them, which naturally 
leads to Trialism. For another, there is a plausible connection between an explanatory argument and 
the fact that it exists: intuitively, the premises of the former explain the latter, thereby leading to a 
close cousin of the Straightforward Account not about metaphysical explanation but about facts 
about metaphysically explanatory arguments. 
The second component of the account I sketched above raises the question of whether the 
view inherits a problem from the Straightforward Account, initially raised by Shamik Dasgupta. 
Dasgupta complains that the Straightforward Account implies that facts that should intuitively “get 
different explanations get the same explanation” (2014b: 573). For example, P <e PvP and P<e ~~P 
would both be explained by P; yet one might feel that some fact about how disjunction works 
should figure in the explanation of the first fact and some fact about how negation works should 
figure in the explanation of the second. There is an analogous objection to my proposed explanation 
of the existence of the corresponding explanatory arguments: they both appear to be explained by P, 
which makes no mention of disjunction or negation. Moreover, one might think that the proper 
lesson to draw from this is that we shouldn’t think of the explanatory analogue of Carroll’s regress as 
vicious: perhaps the logical connection between P and PvP (and also the way this logical connection 
ensures, along with P, that PvP—and so on) does figure among PvP’s explanantia even if it doesn’t 
have to be added as a premise to make the argument from P to PvP valid.42 
In response, we should first note that there are two separate ideas behind Dasgupta’s objection. 
One is that if a fact to be explained involves a certain kind of structure (for example: it is itself an 																																																								
41 The Straighforward Account has been defended by Bennett (2011) and deRosset (2013). 
42 Thanks to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this complication. 
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explanation fact with a disjunctive explanandum), its explanans has to say something about that 
structure (in the case at hand, about disjunction). Call this the Structural Requirement. A second idea 
is that if two facts about metaphysical explanation are different, there has to be a difference between 
their explanantia that accounts for this difference. So, the second part of Dasgupta’s complaint has 
to do with an unexplained contrast: the explanantia of P <e PvP and of P <e ~~P (or of the 
existence of the corresponding explanatory arguments—a qualification I will omit in the next few 
paragraphs, for better readability) should account for the difference between P <e PvP and P <e 
~~P, which is something that simply citing P doesn’t deliver. Call this the Contrastive Requirement. 
These two aspects are worth distinguishing because deRosset (2013: 20–21) addresses (in my 
view convincingly) a complaint similar to Dasgupta’s, but when doing so he’s mostly focusing on the 
Structural Requirement. However, I think his answer can be shown also to addresses the Contrastive 
Requirement. His first point is that if there is a problem here, it’s not specific to metaphysical 
explanation facts. For example, if the explanation of P <e PvP should indeed mention disjunction, 
why shouldn’t the explanation of PvP as well? But if it should, we need to revise a lot more than the 
answer to the Question of Explaining Explanation I offered above. We would need to abandon any 
grounding claim according to which some lower-level facts ground some higher-level fact such that 
the grounds make no mention of the higher-level facts. I take it that this consequence is sufficiently 
implausible to cast doubt on the Structural Requirement. But note that a similar reasoning is equally 
effective against the Contrastive Requirement. If P <e PvP and P <e ~~P should have different 
explanantia, then it would seem that so should PvP and ~~P. After all, merely citing P doesn’t 
explain the difference between PvP and ~~P, either. More generally: the Contrastive Requirement 
threatens to yield a generic ban on “grounding forks”, i.e. facts that ground at least two facts, neither 
of which is a partial ground of the other. Yet grounding forks seem ubiquitous. The fact that 
Socrates exists grounds both the fact that {Socrates} exists and the fact that some philosopher 
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exists. But neither of the latter two facts is a partial ground of the other, and their ground doesn’t 
involve anything that would account for the difference between set formation and existential 
quantification. 
Second, deRosset also identifies an intuition that plausibly motivates the Structural 
Requirement: that the total explanatory story we need to tell to explain P <e PvP needs to mention 
disjunction somewhere, and that the complete explanatory story we need to tell to explain P <e ~~P 
needs to mention negation somewhere. However, as he points out this doesn’t mean that disjunction 
and negation need to be mentioned by the respective explanantia. This observation, too, can serve 
double duty in resisting the Contrastive Requirement.  P <e PvP and P <e ~~P differ in the 
explanatory stories we need to tell to get them: the first uses disjunction introduction whereas the 
second uses negation introduction. Still, these inference rules don’t need to be mentioned among the 
explanantia of these facts. Similarly, the total explanatory story we need to tell to get an argument to 
the effect that there is an explanatory argument from P to PvP will differ from the total explanatory 
story we need to tell to get an argument to the effect that that there is an explanatory argument from 
P to ~~P. But this is something we can accept without endorsing the Contrastive Requirement, 
since it doesn’t follow that disjunction and negation need to be mentioned in the explanantia themselves. 
It’s worth adding that when we reject the Contrastive Requirement we don’t thereby reject the 
demand for an explanation of the difference between the explanatory argument from P to PvP and 
the explanatory argument from P to ~~P. It’s just that the explanation of why these arguments 
differ doesn’t have to be the same as the explanation of why either argument exists. Instead, it can 
be something entirely banal; for example, perhaps the explanatory argument from P to PvP is 
different from the explanatory argument from P to ~~P simply because they have different 
conclusions, and if two arguments have different conclusions they cannot be identical. 
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In the foregoing paragraphs I didn’t intend to show beyond doubt that facts about the 
connection between an explanatory argument’s premises and its conclusion must not be counted 
among the explanantia of why that explanatory argument exists. After all, Carroll’s puzzle shows that 
inference rules don’t need to be added as premises to make an argument valid, but it doesn’t 
automatically follow that they can’t serve as explanantia. My point is, rather, that we don’t need to 
count them as such; there is a perfectly acceptable alternative that gives justice to the intuition 
behind both the Structural Requirement and the Contrastive Requirement without ultimately caving 
in to them. But if you still think that the explanans of why such and such explanatory argument 
exists should mention the inference rules used in the argument (or corresponding logical laws, or 
some such), I’m happy to leave open this possibility as a fallback option. My main purpose was only 
to show that one way or other, e-theorists who identify metaphysical explanations with arguments 
have the resources to partly deflect and partly answer the Question of Explaining Explanation. 
To be sure, I didn’t consider all possible views in logical space that reject the Backing Model, so 
it would be too strong to conclude that the Question of Explaining Explanation doesn’t arise if we 
reject this model. But pattern subsumption views, along with the idea that a metaphysical 
explanation is a particular type of argument, provide a natural alternative to the Backing Model. 
Moreover, this alternative is arguably the most popular one among e-theorists and has well worked 
out analogues in the scientific explanation literature. For this reason, even the limited conclusion 
that argument theorists of explanation can address (and to some extent deflect) the Question of 
Explaining Explanation is of great significance. 
 
5. The Question of Producing Explanation 
The Question of Explaining Explanation arises for everyone; it’s another matter that most 
grounding theorists are in a good position to easily answer or even dismiss it, without having to 
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recourse to the kinds of considerations that usually go into answering the question. By contrast, the 
Question of Producing Explanation (as well as the other two disambiguations of QIG I will consider 
later) only arises for p-theorists. However, we can now use some of the easy answers to the 
Question of Explaining Explanation to generate similarly straightforward answers to the Question 
of Producing Explanation. I will go by the same distinction I relied on in the previous section: either 
the production facts fully explain the metaphysical explanation facts or they need to be 
supplemented with ancillary conditions. 
 
5.1. Simple Productionism and the Question of Producing Explanation 
In section 4.2, I introduced Simple Productionism as the view that the production facts fully explain 
the metaphysical explanation facts: 
 
Simple Productionism about Explaining Explanation 
□((A1…An <e B) → ((A1…An <p B) <e (A1…An <e B))) 
 
We can quickly verify that this view immediately settles what produces the metaphysical explanation 
facts. Take some fact about metaphysical explanation, A1…An <e B. According to above the 
principle, this fact is metaphysically explained by A1…An <p B. But what explains the higher-order 
metaphysical explanation fact (A1…An <p B) <e (A1…An <e B)? Since Simple Productionism is a 
general thesis, it should be true of any fact about metaphysical explanation, including the higher-
order fact at issue. This gives us 
 
((A1…An <p B) <p (A1…An <e B)) < e ((A1…An <p B) <e (A1…An <e B)) 
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But if this sentence is true, its explanans clause is true as well. And its explanans clause explicitly 
specifies that what produces A1…An <e B is A1…An <p B. Since I didn’t rely on any particular 
feature of A1…An and B in the above this reasoning (for example, I didn’t assume that they have no 
further explanatory structure), we can infer the following general principle: 
 
Simple Productionism about Producing Explanation 
□((A1…An <e B) → ((A1…An <p B) <p (A1…An <e B))) 
 
Thus a metaphysical explanation fact’s producer is the same fact as the one that metaphysically 
explains that metaphysical explanation fact. This answers the Question of Producing Explanation 
for adherents of a simple version of the Backing Model. It’s essentially the same answer as the one 
we ended up with to the Question of Explanation Explanation. Namely: the metaphysical 
explanation facts are not only metaphysically explained but also produced by the production facts. 
 
5.2. Ancillary Productionism and the Question of Producing Explanation 
In section 4.2 I distinguished two kinds of answers to the Question of Explaining Explanation that 
appeal to ancillary conditions besides production. The first one was 
 
Naïve Ancillary Productionism about Explaining Explanation 
□((A1…An, C1…Ck <e B) → ((A1…An, C1…Ck <p B) <e (A1…An, C1…Ck <e B))) 
 
I argued against this view on the basis that it objectionably treats ancillary conditions as producers 
themselves, which goes against the whole rationale of giving these conditions a special status. In its 
place, I offered a more complicated account, Sophisticated Ancillary Productionism about 
	 32 
Explaining Explanation, which systematically assigns the ancillary conditions to an explanatory role 
different from that of the production base: it says that as a matter of necessity, whenever A1…An, 
C1…Ck <e B, it’s also the case that (A1…An <p B, C’1…C’m) <e (A1…An, C1…Ck <e B). 
If we take a closer look at this formulation, we can easily see that it already implicitly answers 
the Question of Producing Explanation. For something counts as an ancillary condition in an 
explanation just in case it’s part of the explanans base but not of the production base. So, we can get 
the production base of any explanation by removing all the ancillary conditions from its explanans 
base. This gets us the following principle: 
 
Sophisticated Ancillary Productionism about Producing Explanation 
□((A1…An, C1…Ck <e B) → ((A1…An <p B) <p (A1…An, C1…Ck <e B))) 
 
We can now see that while Sophisticated Ancillary Productionism and Simple Productionism give 
different answers to the Question of Explaining Explanation, they basically agree on the Question of 
Producing Explanation: on both views, the full producer of a metaphysical explanation fact E is a 
fact to the effect that E’s production base produces E’s explanandum. On reflection, this shouldn’t 
be surprising. Simple and Ancillary Productionism offer different accounts of metaphysical 
explanation in so far as the latter, but not the former, assigns a significant role to ancillary 
conditions. But they don’t differ in their treatment of production itself. It’s just that according to 






6. The Question of Producing Production 
What produces the production facts? Unlike in the previous cases, we cannot get my proposed 
interpretations of the Backing Model to mechanically spit out an answer to this question. We could 
squeeze out such an answer if the following principle were true: 
 
(Dubious) □ ((X1…Xm <e (A1…An <e B)) → (X1…Xm <e (A1…An <p B))) 
 
But it’s not clear why we should believe that. The Backing Model (on either of the two 
interpretations I offered) allows us to draw inferences from the metaphysical explanation facts to the 
production facts, or more accurately, from sentences whose main connective is <e to sentences 
whose main connective is <p. It is this feature I exploited when I offered “easy” answers to the 
Question of Explaining Explanation and the Question of Producing Explanation in sections 4 and 
5. But to get Dubious, we would also need to infer from a sentence whose main connective is <e 
another sentence whose main connective is <e, albeit with a different explanandum clause. There is 
nothing in the Backing Model as such to automatically license such a move. 
I’m inclined to think that the Question of Producing Production is where the energy spent on 
answering QIG could be most fruitfully directed, since I have no “easy” answer to offer to this 
question. However, this doesn’t mean that the preceding discussion has no bearing on it. This is 
because the plausibility of some of the arguments that have been offered in defense of one answer 
or other to QIG crucially depends on which interpretation of QIG we are focusing on. Without 
defending any first-order view in detail, let me demonstrate this point through one example. 
Some are attracted to a kind of Trialism about production: the production facts are inapt to be 
produced because they are the wrong sorts of things to be produced. Dasgupta (2014b) defended a 
close cousin of this view: the grounding facts are grounded by facts about essence, which are in turn 
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the wrong kinds of things to be grounded. Most of the details of Dasgupta’s view need not concern 
us here; what I want to emphasize is that he motivates it through an analogy with causation. Facts 
about pure arithmetic, he notes, are not apt to be caused; likewise, the grounding facts (or perhaps the 
facts that ground the grounding facts) are not apt to be grounded. This argument received a 
substantial amount of criticism, most of which has been directed at Dasgupta’s analogy between 
causation and grounding.43 
I don’t intend to weigh in on the debate between Dasgupta and his opponents here. I only wish 
to make one point: Dasgupta’s argument doesn’t even get off the ground if interpreted as an 
argument for Trialism about the Question of Explaining Explanation. Whether causation is 
analogous to grounding qua production is a matter of dispute, which should be adjudicated on the 
basis of a careful comparison of the logical and structural features of the two relations. But inferring 
the features of metaphysical explanation from the features of causation is just a mistake; it relies on a 
conflation of causation with causal explanation (or, if you like, production with metaphysical 
explanation). So, while Dasgupta’s argument from causal analogy might be defensible when 
understood as an argument for Trialism about production, it is a non-starter when interpreted as an 
argument for Trialism about metaphysical explanation. 44  As we have seen, Trialism about 
metaphysical explanation is clearly false if some version of the Backing Model is true, while it is true 
on argument views of explanation, but for reasons that have nothing to do with considerations 
about causation. 
																																																								
43 See deRosset 2013, Glazier 2017, and Sider forthcoming. For general criticisms of the grounding-causation analogy, 
see Koslicki 2016 and Bernstein 2016. 
44 As a matter of fact, Dasgupta himself means metaphysical explanation by ‘grounding’. So, his argument supports his 
own version of Trialism less well than a p-theoretic reinterpretation of it. 
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Now, it may well turn out that Trialism is implausible even when understood as a thesis about 
production—as I said, I have no interest in settling the issue here. I mentioned this example merely 
for illustrative purposes: the various moves and counter-moves in the fast-growing literature on 
iterated grounding cannot be evaluated without first getting clear on which disambiguation of QIG 
is at issue. As I earlier argued, most theorists can give “easy” answers to the Question of Explaining 
Explanation and consequently also to the Question of Explaining Production. By contrast, I suspect 
that the Question of Producing Production is a substantive question that is not settled by the 
foregoing considerations. However, “not settled” doesn’t mean “not affected”: potentially forceful 
arguments for answers to the Question of Producing Production may be entirely misguided when 
reframed as arguments for analogous answers to the Question of Explaining Explanation. 
Dasgupta’s argument from causal analogy for Trialism is one case in point; there may well be others. 
 
7. The Question of Explaining Production 
In the previous section I argued that the considerations that led to “easy answers” to the Question 
of Explaining Explanation and the Question of Producing Explanation didn’t license a similarly 
deflationary approach to the Question of Producing Production. As far as I can see, it is this 
question that should be in the forefront of future research on QIG. 
While the answer to the Question of Producing Production is far from obvious, the answer to 
the Question of Explaining Production is trivial given any particular answer to the Question of Production. 
There are three possibilities. One is that the production facts are not produced (perhaps because 
they are inapt to be produced). In this case, given the Backing Model, they are also not explained. To 
be clear, it is not at all obvious that a fact can be metaphysically explained only if it’s produced; in 
section 4.3 I discussed an important group of views that deny this. What is obvious is that if the 
Backing Model is true then metaphysical explanation requires production, in which case the 
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production facts cannot be explained unless they are produced. A second possibility is that 
whichever facts, X1…Xn, explain the production facts, ancillary conditions are not among them. In 
that case, the explanans base of the production facts is simply their production base; therefore, it’s 
simply X1…Xn that explain the production facts. And a third possibility is that the producers of the 
production facts metaphysically explain those facts only together with some ancillary conditions. In 
that case, it’s the producers X1…Xn and the ancillary conditions together that metaphysically explain 
the production facts. 
Of course, the hard part is figuring out what X1…Xn are, a question I said nothing about in the 
previous section. What is clear is that whatever they are, once we specified them there is no further 
barrier to answering the Question of Explaining Production. This reinforces the suspicion that it’s 
the Question of Producing Production that should have been the main focus of the iterated 
grounding literature from the get-go. 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
QIG has generated a great amount of discussion, but most of it has proceeded in isolation from a 
number of foundational questions concerning grounding. Most important of these are the relation 
between grounding and metaphysical explanation and the role (or lack thereof) of ancillary 
conditions in the latter. I have argued that once we draw the relevant distinctions, we are faced with 
no fewer than four questions of iterated grounding. I have also argued that given some plausible 
interpretative assumptions about what it would mean for grounding (or any other relations, 
collectively: “production”) to back metaphysical explanation, several salient views about grounding 
automatically imply “easy” answers to at least some of these questions. To make my main findings 
easier to understand, I summarized them in a chart below. 
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These findings are significant, but one shouldn’t draw hasty conclusions from them. I have argued 
only that we can often get an automatic answer to the relevant interpretation of QIG. This doesn’t 
necessarily mean that we need to reject some other answers that have been given in the literature. For 
example, Litland (2017) defends a novel answer to QIG that appeals to the notions of zero-
grounding and non-factive grounding, but which, he argues, is fully consistent with Bennett’s and 
deRosset’s Straightforward Account; it’s just that in an important sense, it gives a deeper and more 
informative answer. Similarly, in those cases where I defended an “easy” answer to a disambiguation 
of QIG, nothing rules out alternative answers that might also correctly answer the respective 
disambiguation. (Of course, things are different in cases where I argued that we should reject the 
relevant question as illegitimate; this does rule out views that attempt to give a substantive answer.) 
Still, I think we can draw a number of important conclusions. First, it’s surprising that most 
grounding theorists can answer at least some versions of QIG so easily, and that they can do so 
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independently of the sorts of considerations that usually go into answering the question. Second, 
many of the easy answers are incompatible with popular constraints on acceptable answers to QIG. 
Most obviously, since all forms of productionism explain the metaphysical explanation facts in terms 
of production facts that feature some non-fundamental (because produced) facts, these views violate 
Purity as well as Dasgupta’s level-connecting constraint. Whether this is a reason to reject the 
constraints or the Backing Model itself is a substantive question I cannot settle here, but something 
has to give. Third, if nothing else, my discussion shows that how we specify the connection between 
grounding and metaphysical explanation heavily bears on QIG. We cannot fruitfully discuss what 
grounds the grounding facts without first addressing the difficult issue of what grounding is and 
how it’s related to metaphysical explanation.45 
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